Supreme Court\u27s Construction of the Federal Constitution in 1920-1921 by Powell, Thomas Reed
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 3 
1922 
Supreme Court's Construction of the Federal Constitution in 
1920-1921 
Thomas Reed Powell 
Columbia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas R. Powell, Supreme Court's Construction of the Federal Constitution in 1920-1921, 20 MICH. L. 
REV. 261 (1922). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol20/iss3/1 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Vor,. XX 
MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 
JANUARY, 1922 No. 3 
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 1920-1921, III1 
IV. Por,ICJ~ PowER 
T HE difficulty of classifying cases on the police power has not evaporated since the review of decisions for the preceding year. 
The headings there suggested are used here. Classification on the 
basis of the objects of the legislation appears too precarious to 
be attempted with any confidence. It seems safer to work along 
the line of the subject matters with which the legislation deals. 
Certain topics are species of a wider genus, and thus the same case 
may be put in two or more groups. Readers who are dissatisfied 
with the classification adopted may· be assured of the sympathy of 
the perpetrator. 
1. Physical Conditions 
A statute of Wyoming having for its declared purpose "the con~ 
servation of natural gas" was sustained in Walls v. Midland Carbon 
Co.2 over the dissent of Chief Justice White and Justices Van 
Devanter and McReynolds. The legislature had declared that the 
use of natural gas for the products "where" such gas is consumed 
"without the heat therein contained being fully and actually applied 
and utilized for other manufacturing purposes or d0mestic pur~ 
1 For the preceding instalments reviewing cases on Miscellaneous National 
Powers, Regulation of Commerce, and Taxation, see 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. l-23, 
135-172, (November and December, 1921). 
2 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. u8 (1920). See Thomas W. Shelton, ''The 
Police Power Versus Property Rights," 7 VA. L. Riw. 455; and notes in 19 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 555, 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 386, and 27 W. VA. L. Q. 255. 
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poses" is wasteful and "unlawful when such gas well or source 
of supply is located within ten miles of any incorporated town or 
industrial plant." Another section of the act specifically forbade 
the itse of gas for manufacturing carbon without fully utilizing the 
heat for other manufacturing or domestic purposes. The case came 
before the court on a bill brought by a carbon company to enjoin 
the at1;orney general and other state officers from enforcing the 
statute. There were opposing affidavits as to the wastefulness of 
the company's methods of making carbon black and as to the ensu-
ing exhaustion of its wells, and the decision is reached without 
specific findings on these controverted points. It was assume.d that 
use for carbon black is more remunerative than use for heat and 
light for domestic and industrial purposes; but it was said that, 
"conceding a power to the state of regulation, a comparison of the 
value of the industries and a judgment upon them as affecting the 
state, was for it to make." Without indicating just what quanti-
tative comparison was made between the gallons of ink derived 
from the carbon black and the cubic feet of gas that might be used 
for heat and light, Mr. Justice McKenna adduced the averment 
·of the company that 1,000 feet of gas was consumed to produce 
one and three-quarters pounds of carbon and two-tenths of a gal-
lon of gasoline, and added: 
"We have seen that the method of production by natural 
gas· is like holding a cold plate over a candle, or, as it is 
expressed by a witness, can only be produced 'by combus-
tion and the impinging of the flame on the metallic surface' ; 
and there is a great disproportion between the gas and the 
product, and necessarily there was presented to the judg-
ment and policy of the state a comparison of utilities, which 
involved as well the preservation of the natural resources 
of the state and the equal participation in them by the people 
of the state; and the duration of this utility was for the 
consideration of the state, and we do not think that the state 
was r.equired by the ConstitlJ.tion of the United States to 
stand idly by while these resources were disproportionately 
used, or used in such way that tended to their depletion, 
having no power of interference." 
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The act was said to ·be none the less a conservation measure because 
limited to wells within ten miles of towns or industrial plants. 
This limitation was held also not to deny equal protection of the 
laws to plants within the prescribed zones. The contention of the 
company that the enforcement of the statute impaired the obliga-
tions of preexisting contracts is mentioned, but is left to fall with 
the approval of the statute as a proper police measure, with no 
more specific refutation. One of the allegations of the company 
was that "the operation of the plant and the recovery of gas from 
the wells supplying the same would be impossible if the plant should 
cease to be operated, for the reason that the gas cannot be sold to 
other users in that locality in sufficient quantities to render the 
extraction of gasoline therefrom commercially profitable." Whether 
the court means to decide that the use of the gas for carbon black 
may be forbidden when this is the only use possible is nevertheless 
somewhat doubtful, for Mr. Justice McKenna asserts that the 
statute does not prohibit the use of natural gas absolutely but only 
wastefully.3 
The power to fix fire limits and to forbid the erection of wooden 
buildings therein is necessarily affirmed in Maguire v. Reardon.,,. 
by the decision that a city will not be enjoined from demolishing a 
wooden building erected jn defiance of such a prohibition. The -
third and last paragraph of Mr. Justice McReynolds's opinion reads 
as follows: 
"The meaning and effect of the charter and ordinances 
thereunder are questions of local law, determination of 
which by the state courts we commonly accept as conclusive, 
It is admitted that the building was constructed within defined 
fire limits, and the supreme court of the state has said that 
this was contrary to valid regulations then in force. The 
challenged ordinance must therefore be treated as affecting 
an unlawful structure, and as so applied we can find no 
plausible ground for holding it in conflict with the federal 
Constitution."5 
s The power to order the destruction of infected trees in order to pro-
tect others is considered in 34 HARV. L. Rsv. 672 and 19 M1cH. L. Rsv. 554 . 
.,,. 255 U. S. 211, 41 Sup. Ct. 255 (1921}. 
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2. Food, Drink and Drugs 
A Minnesota statute sustained in Minnesota v. Martinson6 
imposed detailed regulations on the prescription and sale of habit-
forming drugs. The offense for which the defendant was convicted 
was the furnishing by a physician of forbidden drugs to habitual 
users out of stock kept on hand by him. The chief objection urged 
against the statute was that it interfered with the enforcement of 
the federal law imposing a tax on dispensers of drugs. The claimed 
interference was held not to exist. In answer to a due-process 
complaint, Mr. Justice Day said: 
"There can be no question of the authority of the state in 
the exercise of its police power to regulate the administra-
tion, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and habit-form-
ing drugs, such as are named in the statute. The right to 
exercise this power is so manifest in the interest of the 
public health and welfare that it is unnecessary to enter 
upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly 
established to be successfully called in question."1 
3. Ocmpations and Professions 
A requirement that drivers of motor vehicles should satisfy 
designated officials as to their competence and be licensed was 
~ Municipal "zoning'' is discussed in 9 CALIF. L. R.lw. I64, I9 MICH. L. 
REv. I9I, and 30 YALE L. J. I7I, I74, 204, 205, 292; the establishment of 
building lines, in 34 HARV. L. REv. 4I9, 433, I9 MICH. L. REv. 327, and 7 VA. 
L. REV. 66!; the prohibition of street meetings, in 2I Cm:,uM. L. REv. 275 
and 5 MINN. L. Ri;v. I52; the prohibition of an undertaking establishment 
in certain parts of a city, in I9 MICH. L. R.lw. 353. For consideration oi 
undertaking establishments and "funeral homes" as nuisances at common 
law, see IQ MICH. L. R.lw. III, 450, and I Wis. L. REv. IIQ. Whether a cotton 
gin is a nuisance is discussed iru 7 VA. L. R.lw. 66I. For consideration of an 
indirect method of obtaining what cannot be prohibited under the police 
power, see Alfred E. Cohen, "Racial Restrictions in Covenants in Deeds," 
6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 737. 
6 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 425 (I92I). 
1 Laws relating to food are considered in C. P. Berry, "Validity of Laws 
Regulating Capacity or Dimensions of Containers," 9I CENT. L. J. 2..i7; and 
notes in 34 HARv. I,. REv. 672 on prohibiting the possession of fish in the 
closed season, and in I9 MICH. L. Ri;v. 739 on requiring hotels using foreign 
eggs tq post a sign to that effect. 
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held in Johnson v. Maryland8 to be inapplicable to drivers of gov-
ernment-owned trucks carrying the mail, because of the interfer-
ence with a federal function. Justices Pitney and McReynolds 
dissented. The general power of the state was not involved. 
Whether keeping a dog is an occupation depends upon the point 
of view. At any rate, a New York statute penalizing the owning 
OIJ harboring of a dog without having the required license was sus-
tained in Nicchia v. New York.9 Mr. Justice McReynolds observed 
that "property in dogs is of an imperfect or qualified nature and 
they may be subjected to drastic police regulations by the state 
without depriving the owners of any federal right." 
4. Personal Conduct 
The state espionage law sustained in Gilber'f: v. Minnesota10 made 
it unlawful to advocate or teach that men should not enlist in the 
military or naval forces of the United States or should not assist 
the United States in war. ~ong the grounds on which it was 
supported was that it is "a simple exertion of the police power to 
preserve the peace of the state" by forbidding remarks that pro-
voked others to wrath. As Mr. Justice McKenna puts it: 
"And the state knew the conditions which existed, and 
could have a solicitude for the public peace, and this record 
justifies it. Gilbert's remarks were made in a public meet-
ing. They were resented by his auditors. There were pro-
testing interruptions, also accusations and threats against 
him, disorder and intimations of violence. And such is not 
an uncommon experience. On such occasions feeling usu-
ally runs high and is impetuous; there is a prompting to vio-
lence, and when violence is once yielded to, before it can be 
quelled, tragedies may be enacted. To preclude such result 
or a danger of it is a proper exercise of the police power of 
the state." 
This part of the opinion is related to the position that the state was 
not usurping a function belonging exclusively to the national gov-' 
8 254 U. S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct. 16 (1920). 
o 254 U. S. 228, 41, Sup. Ct. 103 (1020). 20 MrcH. L. Rm. 170. See 30 
YAI.E L. J. 426. 
10 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125 (1920). · See 15 Ju,. L. Rtv. 530. 
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ernment. That it does not mean that the state may forbid any and 
all talk that may evoke a muscular response is to be inf erred from 
the fact that Mr. Justice McKenna went on to give reasons why 
the particular statute is ~ot "violative of the right of free speech." 
The momentous question whether "the_ right of free speech is a 
natural and inherent right" was left without an authoritative answer. 
For the purposes of the case Mr. Justice McKenna conceded "that 
the asserted freedom is natural and inherent," but added that "it 
is not absolute" but "is subject to restriction and limitation." The 
restriction imposed by Minnesota was declared to be justified by 
the decisions that the restrictions imposed by Congress had not vio-
lated the First Amendment. Mr. Justice Holmes confined his con-
currence to the result. Chief Justice White dissented on the ground 
that the action taken by Congress had precluded the operation of 
state law on the same subject. The dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis 
was technically confined to positions based on the federal system 
of government, but he concluded his opinion by saying: 
"As the Minnesota statute is, in my opinion, invalid 
because it interferes with federal functions and with the 
right of a citizen of the United States to discuss them, l! 
see no occasion to consider whether it violates also the Four-
teenth Amendment. But I have difficulty in believing that 
the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, which has been 
held to protect against state denial the right of an employer 
to discriminate against a workman because he is a member 
of a trade union, * * * the right of a business man to con-
duct a private employment agency, * * * or tO' contract out-
side the state for insurance of his property, * * * although 
the legislature deems it inimical to the public welfare, does 
not include liberty to teach, either in the privacy of the home 
or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism; so long, at least, as 
Congress has not declared that the public safety demands 
its suppression. I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment includes - only liberty to 
· acquire and to enjoy property."11 
11 A case holding that a state in punishing criminal syndicalism is not 
limited to the definition of treason in the federal Constitution is considered 
in 19 M1cH. L. Rr:v. 746. Prohibitions against loafing. are discussed in 2'J 
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5. Incidents of Rights of A,ction 
A recovery of a penalty and an attorney's fee in a successful 
action against an insurance company on a policy was sustained in 
Hartford Life lnsttrance Co. v. Blincoe.rt. The company had pre-
vailed on the first writ of error in the United States Supreme 
Court, but on the retrial in the state court had lost on grounds on 
which the state decision was held to be final. The question whether, 
under these circumstances, the company had "vexatiously refused 
to pay" was held to be a question for the state court, to which was 
added that it would "be extreme to hold that the statute or its con-
struction is a violation of the Fourteenthi Amendment." There was 
dissent from Justices Holmes, Van Devanter and McReynolds, but 
whether upon this or upon other points in the case does not appear.13 
6. Industrial Relations 
Workmen's compensation legislation came before the court in 
three cases. The complaint urged against the Ohio law in Thornton 
v. Duffy14 was confined to an amendment which withdrew from 
employers their previous liberty to insure in private companies and 
which compelled contributions to a state fund. Such compulsory 
contribution had previously been sanctioned in sustaining the Wash-
ington compensation law, and Chief Justice White concurred solely 
on the ground of stare decisis. His original objections he restated 
as follows: 
W. VA. L. Q. I7I, I98; anti-cigarette laws; in I9 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 557; and 
regulations of the hours of dancing, in Q CALIF. L. Ri;;v • .34.3. and IQ MICH. 
L. Ri;;v. 883. Regulations of the treatment of disease receive consideration 
in Albert F. Gilmore, "Justice and the Law," 24 LAW Notts 229; Harry R. 
Trusler, "Compulsory Sex Hygiene and Examination," 55 AMER. L. Ri;;v. 
233; and a note in 2I CoLUM. L. Rl;;v. 90 on state control of venereal disease. 
12 255 U. S. I29, 4I Sup. Ct. 276 (I92I). 
13 The question whether responsibility for injuries caused by automobiles 
may be put on owners not personally at fault is considered in 6 CoRN~Lr, 
L. Q. 187, 34 HARV. L. Rl;;v. 434 19 MICH. L. Rl;;v. 333, and 30 YAL~ L. J. 427. 
In I9 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 556 is discussion of the question whether a state may 
limit the dower right of non-residents to land of which the husband dies 
seized. 
14 254 U. S. 36!, 4I Sup. Ct. I37 (I920). See IS !Lr,. L. Rl;;v. 531, and 
19 M1cH. L. Ri;;v. 731. 
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"To compel an employer to insure his employee against 
loss from injury sustained in the course of the employment 
without reference to the negligence of the employee, and at 
the same time to prohibit the employer from insuring him-
self against the burden thus imposed, it seems to me, if orig-
inally considered, would be a typical illustration of the taking 
of property without due process of law and a violation of 
the equal protection of the law." 
This seems hardly a correct view of the statute before the court, 
since the contributions to the state fund were payments for insur-
ance furnished by the state. Mr. Thornton's lament was not that 
he could not insure himself against loss, but that after he had 
obtained such insurance from a private corporation he was com-
pelled to insure again with the state. His criticism of the retroac-
tive element in his situation was met by pointing out that the pro-
vision in the original statute ·permitting private insurance was 
expressly declared to be subject to withdrawal. The inference from 
Mr. Justice McKenna's opinion is that employers still remained 
at liberty to deal directly with their employees and to guarantee 
compensation in other ways than by insurance, provided they did 
not take out private contracts of insurance. The original statute 
and the amendment are commented on as follows : 
"The law expressed the constitutional and legislative pol-
icy of the state to be that compensation to workmen for 
injuries received in their employment was a matter of public 
concern, and should not be left to the individual employer 
or employee, or be dependent upon or influenced by the 
hazards of controversy or litigation, or inequality of con-
ditions. There was an attempt at the accommodation of the 
new policy to old conditions in the concession to employers 
to deal directly with their employees, but there was precau-
tion against failure in the provision of Section :23 giving dis-
cretion to the commission to withdraw the concession. After 
a few years' experience that discretion was turned into a 
duty, and by the amendment of March :20, 1917, the conces-
sion was taken away from those employers who indemnified 
themselves by insurance. This was considered necessary to 
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execute the policy of the state, and we are unable to yield 
to the contention that property rights or contract rights had 
accrued against it. To assert that the first steps of a policy 
make it immutable is to assert that imperfections and errors 
in legislation become constitutional rights. This is a narrow 
conception of sovereignty. It is, however, not new, and we 
have heretofore been invoked to pronounce judgment against 
it. Complying, we said that an exercise of public policy can-
not be resisted because of conduct or contracts done or made 
upon the faith of former exercise of it upon the ground that 
its later exercises deprive of property or invalidate those 
contracts." 
Mr. Justice McR.eynolds dissented without opinion. He is the only 
one of the original minority of four objecting to such legislation 
who still remains recalcitrant. 
The complaint unsuccessfully leveled against the Indiana law in 
Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board15 was an assumed denial 
of equal protection of the laws because the compensation act was 
compulsory for all coal-mining companies, while it was permissive 
for others except railroads, which were excluded entirely. No spe-
cific consideration was given to the different treatment of railroads, 
but the difference is undoubtedly justified by the fact that state 
law is not applicable to employees of railroads injured while engaged 
in interstate commerce and that it would be confusing to apply the 
provisions of a compensation statute to employees whose injuries 
might or might not come within the act because of particular cir-
cumstances which could not be foreseen. The coal companies 
brought fonvard statistics to prove that their business was less 
hazardous than that of other industries which were allowed to 
choose whether to come within the _fompensation act or not. There 
were opposing claims based on other statistics or on different deduc-
tions from the same statistics, and there were statements as to the 
financial position of mine-owners and mine-workers and as to their 
situation because of legal departments with regular forces of attor-
neys, etc. Mi. Justice McKenna prefaced his specific comments 
by saying generally: 
15 255 U. S. 144, 41 Sup. Ct. 252 (1921). 
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"The length and character of the reports and ta;bles of 
statistics preclude summary. It may be conceded that dif-
ferent deductions may be made from them, but they and the 
controversies over them and what they justified or demanded 
of remedy were matters for the legislative department and 
that judgment is not open to judicial review. Indeed, there 
may be a comprehension of effects and practical influences 
that cannot be presented to a court and measured by it, and 
which it may be the duty of government to promote or resist, 
or deemed advisable to do so. Degrees of policies, if they 
have bases, are not for our consideration and the bases can-
not be judged of by abst~act speculations or the controver-
sies of opinion. Legislation is impelled and addressed to 
concrete conditions deemed or demonstrated to be obstacles 
to something better, and the better, it may be, having attain-
ment or prospect in different occupations (we say occupa-
tions, as this case is concerned with them) dependent in the 
legislative consideration upon their distinctions in some 
instances, upon their identities in others, and as the case 
may be, associated or separated in regulation. And this is 
the rationale of the principle of classification and of the 
cases which are at once the results and illustrations of it." 
To this was added that it is recognized that coal mining has pecu-
liar conditions, that the coal companies indicate that they regard 
their business as distinctive by seeking to reject the law while other 
equally hazardous enterprises accepted it. The inducements which 
made it seem advantageous to the coal companies to reject the legis-
lation "might well have been the inducement to make it compul-
sory." The fact that there were 30,000 employees engaged in coal 
mining was also mentioned as material. Another objection urged 
by the companies was that the ~ct is compulsory as to all of their 
employees without exclusion of those engaged in non-hazardous or 
less hazardous work. Reliance was placed on opinions of state 
courts adducing in favor of employers' liability laws the fact that 
they were confined to employees engaged in the hazardous work of 
operating trains. Of this Mr. Justice McKenna said: 
"The contention only has strength by regarding Employers' 
Liability Acts and Workmen's Compensation Acts as practi-
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cally identical in the public policy respectively involved in them 
and in effect upon employer and employee. This, we think, 
is without foundation. They both provide for reparation of 
injuries to employees, but differ in manner and effect, and 
there is something more in a compensation law than the ele-
ment of hazard, something that gives room for the power of 
classification which a legislature may exert in its judgment 
of what is necessary for tqe public welfare, to which we 
have adverted, and which cannot be pronounced arbitrary 
because it may be disputed and 'opposed by argument and 
opinion of serious strength.' " 
Earlier it was said that the contention that a difference should be 
made between the various employees according to the hazard of 
their special fobs "commits the law and its application to distinc-. 
tions that might be very confusing in _its administration and stib-
jects it and the controversies that may arise under it to various 
tests of facts and this against the same company." 
The only federal question that was raised in Quong Ham Wah 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissionl." was held to be foreclosed 
by the construction of the statute by the state court in such a way 
as to prevent the question from arising. Under the workmen's 
compensation act of California the power of the commission to 
award reparation for injuries suffered outside the state in the course 
of a contract of employment made within the state was in terms 
confined to injuries suffered by residents of the state. The state 
court had first c9nstrued the statute as it read and held it void 
under the clause in the federal Constitution guaranteeing to citizens 
of each state the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states. On a rehearing the state court held that this constitutional 
objection, instead of rendering the statute wholly void, should cause 
a construction of it which would bring citizens of other states 
within its terms.17 This construction of a state statute, declared 
16 255 U. S. 445, 41 Sup. Ct. 373 ( 1921). 
17 This state decision is discussed in 21 Cor,uM. L. REv. 36g, with special 
reference to the discrimination against non-residents under the privileges 
and immunities clause. 
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Chief Justice White, must be accepted without question by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.18 
7. Commercial Intercourse 
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co.,19 already considered under the 
head of Physical Conditions, sustained a statute which as enforced 
prohibited the use of natural gas for carbon black and in effect 
required it either to be conserved or to be sold for heat and light 
for manufacturing and domestic purposes. Minnesota v. Martin-
son,20 which has been dealt with under the head of Food, Drink 
and Drugs, approved of prohibitions on the sale of habit-forming 
drugs. Other cases involving statutes regulating com~ercial deal-
ings will be treated under the head of Property or Bttsiness Affected 
with a Pttblic Interest. Interpretations of the Sherman Anti-trust 
Law have been referred to in the review of cases on the power of 
Congress over commerce.21 
is In 3 ILL. L. BULL. 100 is a discussion of administrative determinations 
in fixing liability under workmen's compensation acts. Minimum wage legis-
lation is treated in 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 756; statutory penalties for delay in 
paying wages, in 34 H.ARv. L. Rsv. 327. For a series of notes on "Present 
Day Labor Litigation," see 30 YALE L. J. 280, 3n, 404, 501, 6!8, 736. Picket-
ing and intimidation is discussed in 21 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 103 ; secondary boy-
cott by employees of a common carrier, in 30 CoLUM. L. Ri>v. 882. For 
articles on phases of labor legislation, see John T. Clarkson, "The Industrial 
Court Bill,'' 6 low A L. BULL. 153; Milton Dobrzenski, "A Digest of Child 
Labor Laws and Regulations Applicable to California," 8 CALIF. L. Rev. 404; 
Henry B. Higgins, "A New Province for Law and Order," 34 HARV. L. 
Rsv. 105; William L. Huggins, "A Few of the Fundamentals of the Kansas 
Industrial Court Act," 7 A. B. A. JoURN. 265; H. W. Humble, "The Court 
of Industrial Relations in Kansas," 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 675; Walter J. Mat-
tison, "Limitations of Hours of Labor and Fixing of Minimum Wage 
Scale on All Public Work by Statute, Ordinance or Contract,'' 5 MARQUE'.r'l'E 
L. Rsv. 150; William Renwick Riddell, "Labor Legislation in Canada,'' 5 
MINN. L. Rsv. 83, 243; William R. Vance, "The Kansas Court of Industrial 
Realtions with Its Background,'' 30 YALE L. J. 456; and Samuel Williston, 
"Freedom of Contract,'' 6 Cornell L. Q. 365. 
19 Note 2, supra. 
20 Note 6, supra. 
21 In 6g U. PA. L. Rsv. 365 is a note on credit extension as an unfair 
practice under the Interstate Commerce Act; in 30 YALE L. J. 630, 632, dis-
cussion of contracts not to bid as restraint of trade. Statutes forbidding the 
scalping of theatre tickets are considered in 8 CALIF. L. Rsv. 429, 19 MICH. 
L. Rsv. 871, and 5 MINN. L. Rsv. 68. Blue sky laws are treated in 25 LAW 
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8. Met hods of Enforcement 
Exercise of administrative power to enforce police regulations 
will find illustration in a later section on Administrative Power and 
Procedure. Administrative action in regulating prices and in 
enforcing other requirements on public utilities appears in a number 
of the cases included under Property or Business Affected with a 
Public Interest. Nicchia v. New York22 allows a state to use a pri-
vate corporation to aid in the enforcement of a law requiring dogs 
to be licensed. Goldsmit1z-.Grant Co. v. United States,23 already 
reviewed in the section on T AXA'l'ION, holds that the government 
may confiscate an automobile carrying liquor in violation of the 
revenue laws, although title is in an unpaid conditional vendor not 
implicated in the fraud. The opinion leads to the inference that 
similar methods may ·be used to enforce prohibitions of a police 
character.24 
9. Property or Business Affected witk a Public Interest 
This rather vague caption is used to mark off cases involving 
special duties, restrictions or obligations upon businesses that are 
recognized as "public utilities" or "public service companies" and 
upon possible peripheral enterprises which have some but not all 
of the elements of public utilities pure and undefiled. The use of 
a label is dangerous because of the likelihood that some may wrongly 
assume that whatever regulation may be imposed on one member 
of the class may ·necessarily be imposed on all. It may be mislead-
ing, too, because it may induce the assumption that the regulation 
is justified because the business is a public utility, whereas the more 
satisfactory analysis is that the propriety of the regulation is the 
No:rts 45; prohibition of contracts for contingent fees by attorneys, in 30 
YALE L. J. 82; a requirement that an insurance company must .reject appli-
cations for hail insurance promptly on penalty of having them treated as 
accepted, in 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 224. Another restraint on commercial inter-
course is dealt with in T. J. O'Donnell, "Revie\V of Fight Against Trading 
Stamps," 6 A. B. A. JOURN. 167. 
22 Note 9, supra. 
2a 254 U. S. 505, 41 Sup. Ct. 18g (1921), 20 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 157. 
24 The forfeiture of automobiles illegally transporting liquor is dealt 
with in 20 Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 7g8, 34 HARV. L. R.Ev. 200, 212, 19 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 
3501 r Wis. L. R.Ev. n7, and 30 YAr.E L. J. 91. 
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justification for so classifying the enterprise. To the danger of 
confusing the cart with the horse is added the more serious hazard 
of reasoning in a circle and justifying the regulation by the legal 
quality of the enterprise when that is dependent upon the propriety 
of the regulation. This much, however, is clear. Some enterprises 
are, and some enterprises are not, constitutionally liable to be sub-
- jected to regulation of their prices and to the imposition of the 
duty to serve all, to furnish adequate facilities and to bear special 
burdens which may be made conditions of their enjoyment of their 
special powers. Under the due-process clause an enterprise may 
contend that it is immune from all of these special and peculiar 
requirements or immune from some though not from all. It may 
object to excessively rigorous requirements when concededly more 
moderate ones would be proper. This review is concerned with 
the specific things which may or may not be done to the specific 
complainants, and readers are hereby forbidden to infer anything 
else from any rubric that it may carry. 
(a) Inclusion in the Class for Price Regulation. Two cases by 
votes of five to four sustained statutes restricting landlords in rais-
ing rents and in ousting tenants. In neither case was there involved 
the question whether the particufar restriction was so severe as to 
leave the landlord less than the requisite "fair return on the fair 
value" of his property. Block v. Hirsli20 involved an act of Con-
gress which, as paraphrased by Mr. Justice Holmes, provided that 
25 256 U. S. -, 4I Sup. Ct. 458 (I92I). See George W. Goble, "Are 
Property Interests Secure?" 9 KY. L. J. I49; and notes in 9 CALIF. L. Ri;;v. 
337, I9 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 86g, 5 MINN. L. Rl;;v. 472, 7 VA. L. Rl;;G. n. s. 52, and 
7 VA. L. Ri;;v. 655. For discussion of the constitutional issue prior to the 
Supreme Court decision, see Harold G. Aron, "The New York Landlord and 
Tenant Laws of I920,'' 6 CoRNar, L. Q. I; Alan W. Boyd, "Rent Regulation 
under the Police Power," I9 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 599; Jefferson B. Browne, "The 
Super Constitution,'' 54 AM. L. Ri;;v. 32I; Charles Kellogg Burdick, "Consti-
tutionality of the Ne\v York Rent Laws," 6 CoRNELL L. Q. 310; W. F. Dodd 
and Carl H. Zeiss, "Rent Regulation and Housing Problems," 7 A. B. A. 
JoURN. 5; George W. "Wickersham, "Recent Extensions of the State Police 
Power," 54 A1.r. L. Ri;;v. 801, and "The Police Power and the New York 
-Emergency Rent Laws," 69 U. PA. L. Ri;;v. 3ot; John H. Wigmore, "A Con-
stitutional Way to Reach the Housing Profiteer," I5 hr,. L. Rl;;v. 359; and 
notes in 2I Cor,uM. L. Ri;:v. I72, 34 HARV. L. Ri;:v. ¢, I5 lr,r,. L. Ri;;v. 537, 
16 id. 651 I9 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 95, 437, 6 VA. L. Rl;;G. n. s. 688, and 7 VA. L. 
Ri;:v. 30. 
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the right of a tenant in the District of Columbia to occupy the 
leased premises "is to continue notwithstanding the expiration of 
his term, at the option of the tenant, subject to regulation by the 
Commission appointed by the act, so long as he pays the rent and 
performs the conditions as fixed by the lease or as modified by the 
Commission." In reliance on this statute a tenant defended an 
ejection proceeding brought after the expiration of his lease by a 
landlord who had bought the building while the lease was running. 
The statute recited that the legislation was necessary because of 
emergencies growing out of the war resulting in conditions embar-
rassing to the government in the transaction of the public business. 
The act was limited to two years. Mr. Justice Holmes observed 
that while these declarations in the statute did not conclude the 
courts, they were entitled to great respect and in this instanc~ 
"stated a publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact." The 
existence of the emergency, he said, "must be assumed, and the 
question is whether Congress was incompetent to meet it in the 
way in which it has been met by most of the civilized countries in 
the world.'' He prefaced his answer by saying: 
"The general proposition to be maintained is that circum-
stances have clothed the letting of buildings in the District 
of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify reg-
ulation by law. Plainly, circumstances may so change in 
time or so differ in space as to clothe with such an interest 
what at other times or in other places would be a matter of 
purely private concern. It is enough to refer to the decisions 
as to insurance, * * * irrigation, * * * and mining. * * * 
They sufficiently illustrate what hardly would be denied. 
They illustrate also that the use by the public generally of 
each specific thing affected cannot be made the test of public 
interest, * * * and that the public interest may extend to the 
use of land. They dispel the notion that what in its imme-
diate aspect may be only a private transaction may not be 
raised by its class or character to a public affaii.'' 
The right of regulation is said not to be limited because the prop-
erty affected is tangible in character. Rights in such property have 
been limited under the police power by limiting the height of build-
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
ings, requmng safe pillars in mines, regulating billboards and 
requiring watersheds to be kept clear. Mr. Justice Holmes then 
continues: 
"These cases are enough to establish that a public exigency 
will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in 
land to a certain extent without compensation. But if to 
answer one need the legislature may limit height, to answer 
- another it may limit rent. We do not perceive any reason 
for denying the justification held good in the foregoing cases 
to a law limiting the property rights now in question if the 
public exigency requires that. The reasons are of a different 
nature, but they certainly are not less pressing. * * * Housing 
is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest 
justifying some degree of public control are present. The 
only matter that seems to us open to debate is whether the 
statute goes too far. For just as there comes a point at 
which the police power ceases and leaves only that of emi-
nent domain, it may be conceded that regulations of the 
present sort pressed to a certain height might amount to a 
taking without due process of law." 
In sustaining the reasonableness of the measure, its temporary 
character is relied on. The machinery for securing the landlord a 
fair rent is held adequate, though the courts do not fix the rent, 
since they will decide whether the rent fixed is confiscatory. The 
provision for allowing the tenant in possession to remain "is an 
almost necessary incident of the policy and is traditional in English 
law." While the loss of the chance to profit by the sudden influx 
of population is a part of the value of property, the policy of 
restricting such profits is accepted in taxation and "it goes little 
if at all farther than the restriction put upon the rights of the 
owner of money by the more debatable usury laws." If the end 
in view otherwise justifies the means used, it is not the concern of 
the courts "whether those means were the wisest, whether they 
may not cost more than they come to, or will effect the result 
desired." They cannot be held to have no relation to the end in 
view when the legislation is similar to that resorted to all over the 
world. 
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In dissenting, Mr. Justice McKenna insists that there is no rela-
tion between the means employed and the end professed. If the 
law keeps one tenant in it keeps another out. The statute there-
fore does not supply homes to the homeless. All the contentions 
urged in favor of the statute have heretofore been pronounced 
untenable by the court, says Mr. Justice McKenna. It has been 
declared that the provisions of the Constitution are not suspended 
by an emergency. The fact that the law is of temporary duration 
is immaterial, since "as a power in government, if it exist at all, it 
is perennial and universal and can give what duration it pleases to 
its exercise." The analogies adduced in the majority opinion are 
declared to be wholly inapposite. "They justify the prohibition of 
the use of property to the injury of others." Of the cases concern-
ing mining, insurance and irrigation it is said that it is difficult to 
handle them or the assertion of what they decide, and that "an 
opposing denial only is available." To Mr. Justice McKenna the 
law seems to offend against the due-process clause, the provision 
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation and the prohibition- again,st laws impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. "The prohibitions need no strengthening com-
ment. They are as absolute as axioms. A contract existing, its 
obligation is impregnable." Much of the dissenting opinion con-
sists of laudation of the Constitution and exhortation to keep its 
commandments, with direful vaticinations based on the assumption 
that the court is sanctioning a breach of the Constitution rather 
than holding that the laws before it do not violate its inhibitions. \ 
"The wonder comes to us, what will the country do with its new 
freedom." If it impairs the obligation of contracts for the leasing 
of buildings, will it repudiate its bonds? The reference to similar 
legislation in other countries evokes the comment: 
"The facts are significant and suggest the inquiry, have 
conditions come not only to the District of Columbia embar-
rassing the federal government, but to the world as well, 
that are not amenable to passing palliatives, and that Social-
ism, or some form of Socialism, is the only permanent cor-
rective or accommodation? It is indeed strange that this 
court, in effect, is called upon to make way for it and, 
through an instrument of a Constitution based on personal 
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rights and the purposeful encouragement of individual 
incentive and energy, to declare legal a po,ver exerted for 
their destruction. The inquiry occurs, have we come to the 
realization of the observation that 'War unless it be fought 
for liberty is the most deadly enemy of liberty.' " 
Has the Constitution, continues the rhetorical questioning, "sud-
denly become weak-become not a restraint upon evil government, 
but an impediment to good government?" "Has it become an 
anachronism, and is it to become 'an archeological relic,' no longer 
to be an efficient factor in affairs, but something only to engage and 
entertain the studies of antiquarians?" "Is not this to be dreaded 
-indeed, will it not be the inevitable consequence of the decision 
just rendered?" These questions are not given specific answers 
in the majority opinion. Chief Justice White and Justices Van 
Devanter and McReynolds joined in the dissent of Mr. Justice 
McKenna. 
The New York statute sustained in Marcus Brown Holding Co. 
v. Feldman26 was similar to the congressional act, and the proceed-
ing was an ejectment to get possession of an apartment which the 
tenant continued to occupy after the expiration of his lease. The 
objection that the statutory authorization to remain in violation of 
the tenant's covenant to leave at the end of his term is an impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts was met by Mr. Justice Holmes 
by saying that "contracts are made subject to the exercise of this 
power of the stafe, when otherwise justified, as we have held this 
to be." The discrimination involved in confining the statute to 
certain cities was held to be justified by the difference in the situa-
tion of those cities and the rest of the state and so not a denial of 
equal protection of the laws. The requirement that the landlord 
render certain services in keeping the apartment habitable was 
resisted "on the rather singular ground that it infringes the Thir-
teenth Amendment," but the services were thought sufficiently 
remote from personal services to save the compulsion to render 
them from amounting to involuntary servitude. Mr. Justice 
McKenna, in dissenting, put aside the cases holding that contracts 
2s 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921). For discussion of this decision 
and of the decision in the court below, see references in note 25, s"pra. 
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are made subject to proper exercises of the police power by saying 
that "there is not a line in any of them that declares that the explicit 
and definite covenants of private individuals engaged in a private 
and personal matter are subject to impairment by a state law." If 
the state have a power superior to the contracts clause of the Con-
stitution, "it is superior to every other limitation upon every power." 
While the majority opinion, continues Mr. Justice McKenna, con-
cedes some limitation on rent regulation, there is no definition of 
it, "and the reasoning of the opinion, as we understand it, and its 
implications and its incident, establish practically unlimited power." 
The peroration is as follows: 
""We are not disposed to further enlarge upon the case or 
attempt to reconcile the explicit declaration of the Constitu-
tion against the power of the state to impair the obligations 
of a contract or, under any pretense, to disregard the dec-
laration. It is safer, saner, and more consonant with con-
stitutional preeminence and its purposes to regard the dec-
laration of the Constitution as paramount, and not to weaken 
it by refined dialectics or bend it to some impulse or emer-
gency 'because of some accident of immediate, ovenvhelm-
ing interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the 
judgment.'" 
Chief Justice White and Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds 
concurred in this dissent.27 
(b) Regulation of Rates. The issue presented by the pleadings 
in Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Schmtll28 was whether a state may 
enforce unremunerative rates on a certain class of traffic so long 
as the intrastate rates as a whole are remunerative. 'l'he decision 
21 In 9 CAI.IF. L. Rsv. 440 is a note on what is a public utility; in 19 
M1cH. L. REV. 94. one on whether a cab is a public utility; in 19 MICH. L. 
Rsv. 74. one on regulating the price of coal; and in 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 649, 
one on regulating the price of school books. A somewhat· earlier phase of 
the general problem is considered in Roland G. Kent, "The Edict of Dio-
cletian Fixing Maximum Prices," 6g U. PA. L. Rsv. 35. The contemporary 
problem receives attention in Minor Bronaugh, "State Regulation of Wages 
and Prices of Commodities," 24 LAW NO'.l'ES 205; and Nathan Isaacs, "The 
Revival of the Justum Pretium," 6 Cornell L. Q. 381. 
2s 255 U. S. n3, 41 Sup. Ct. 324 (1921). See I6 Ir,r,. L. Rsv. 133 and 19 
MICH. L. Rsv. 7# 
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is somewhat nebulous owing to the fact that the case is devoid of 
mathematics. Mr. Justice McKenna declares that previous· cases 
have settled that the legislature "is not bound to fix uniform rates 
for all commodities or to secure the same percentage of profit on 
every sort of business," and that the court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the legislature when reviewing "a particular 
tariff or schedule which yields substantial compensation for the 
services it embraces, when the profitableness of the intrastate busi-
ness as a whole is not involved," but that, on the other hand, the 
carrier cannot be compelled to transport a particular class of traffic 
"at a loss or without substantial compensation or to carry a par-
ticular commodity "for less than the proper cost of transportation, 
or virtually at cost." This is said to be a principle "which keeps 
power and right in proper relation" -"power not exercised in excess, 
right not used in abuse." The case was sent back to the court below 
"for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." The 
state court was reversed in its holding that the profitableness of the 
intrastate business as a whole cured any deficiency in the rates on 
particular traffic, but it was not told how remunerative the particular 
traffic must be.29 
29 There were no Supreme Court decisions during the past term on the 
question of the "fair value" of the carrier's property as a basis for rate 
regulation or on the requisites of the procedure for fixing rates or for 
objecting to their unconstitutionality. The problem of valuation receives 
consideration in Robert L. Hale, "The 'Physical Value' Fallacy in Rate 
Cases," 30 YALE L. J. 710; and notes in 6 CoRNEI,r, L. Q. I22 on amortization 
of a short-lived plant, in 2I CoLUM. L. R:sv. I66 on the unearned increment 
and the depreciated dollar, in 34 HARV. L. R:sv. 85 on change of conditions 
making confiscatory a rate previously found to be reqmnerative, and in I9 
MICH. L. R:sv. 849 on increasing dissatisfaction with the cost-of-reproduc-
tion rule. In I5 ILI,. L. R:sv. 284 is a note on Kansas City So. Ry. v~ Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 252 U. S. I78, 40 Sup. Ct. I87 (I920), I9 MICH. 
L. Riw. 26, note 46, which required the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to discover the hypothetical cost of present original construction of existing 
roads for the information of Congress. A question of statutory construction 
with regard to the power of a state commission to fix a rate after a statu-
tory rate has been declared invalid is considered in 34 HARV. L. R:sv. 68o. 
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. 
Ct. 527 (1920), I9 MICH. L. REV. I42, which held that a carrier is entitled 
to independent judicial consideration of the facts material to the question 
of confiscation, is the subject of consideration in Laurence Curtis, 2nd, 
"Judicial Review of Commission," 34 HARV. L. REV. 862; Ernst Freund, 
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In Soitthern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton30 and San Antonio v. 
San Antonio Public Service Co.31 it was conceded that rates imposed 
on street railroads by andent city ordinances had with the passage 
of time become confiscatory, and the determining question in the 
cases was whether these ordinances were contracts by which the 
companies were bound. An examination of the provisions of the 
state constitutions and statutes convinced the court that the cities 
were without the power to contract and that therefore the rates 
could no longer be enforced now that they had become confiscatory.32 
Two cases involve the effect on past transactions of adjudications 
that schedules of rates imposed by the state are valid or invalid. In 
1907 North Dakota prescribed a schedule of rates. The carrier 
declined to put it into effect. The state secured an injunction 
against further disobedience and this was affirmed by the United 
States Supreme Court "without prejudice to the right of the car-
riers to reopen the cases if an adequate trial· of the schedule in the 
future enabled them to prove that it was confiscatory." After a 
time the carrier petitioned the state court to set aside the rates on 
the ground that experience proved them confiscatory. The court 
heard the cases, but found the rates remunerative and continued 
the existing injunctions. This was reversed by the United States 
Supreme Court. A shipper who had been charged more than the 
statutory rates prior to the litigation in which the rates were first 
sustained sued to recover the excess, claiming that the adjudication 
of the validity of the statute involved the invalidity of rates charged 
in disobedience to it. The carrier contended that the fact that this 
first decree was "without prejudice," etc., meant that it was inter-
locutory merely and that the later adjudication that the statutory 
rates were confiscatory superseded the contrary prior adjudication. 
In Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. R. Co. v. C. L. Merrick Co.33 
"The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies,'' ZJ W. VA. L. Q. 
207; Thomas P. Hardman, "Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due 
Process in Rate Regulation,'' 30 Y AL-e L. J. 681; and a note in 69 U. PA. L. 
R-ev. 148. 
'3o 255 U. S. 539, 41 Sup. Ct. 400 ( 1921). 
31 255 U. S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. 428 (1921). 
s2 An analogous issue is considered in C. Brewster Rhoads, "The Police 
Power as a Limitation upon the Contractual Right of Public Service Cor-
porations,'' 6g U. PA. L. R-ev. 317. 
33 254 U. S. 376, 41 Sup. Ct. 142 (1920). 
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the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the state court in 
favor of the shipper, holding that the· first decree concluded all past 
matters. In Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry. Co. v. Washburn 
Coal Co.34 the railroad sued a shipper for compensation in excess 
of the statutory rates; for carriage after the affirmance of the statu-
tory schedule and before it w~s declared confiscatory. The state 
court decided in favor of the shipper on the ground, not that the 
statutory rates were valid, but that the carrier had not asked for 
more and the shipper had not contracted to pay more, that the 
injunction against disobeying the statute had been granted without 
taking any bond or imposing any terms or conditions for the security 
of the carrier, and that the shipper was no more responsible than 
the carrier for what had occurred and therefore was not unjustly 
enriched. The Supreme Court sustained the state court for the 
reason that it did not uphold the statutory rate as such, but rested 
its decision on independent grounds which "are broad enough to 
sustain the judgment, and, if not well taken, are not without sub- · 
stantial support." Such federal questions as might be involved in 
the state decisions were declared not to be reviewable on writ of 
error. 
A private consumer of gas in th(" District of Columbia complained 
in Hollis v. Kutz3G of what he thought an unlawful discrimination 
because he was charged less than the government and less than 
what he would have been charged had the government been charged 
more. To this Mr. Justices Holmes replied: 
"We do not wish to belittle the claim of a taker- of what 
for the time has become pretty nearly a necessity to equal 
treatment while gas is furnished to the public. But the 
notion that the Government cannot make it a condition of 
allowing the establishment of gas works that its needs and 
the needs of its instrument the district shall be satisfied at 
any price that it may fix strikes us as needing no answer 
whatever. The plaintiffs are under no legal obligation to 
take gas nor is the Government bound to allow it to be fur-
nished. If they choose to take it the plaintiffs mus't submit 
34 254 U. S. 370, 41 Sup. Ct. 140 (1920). 
3a 255 U. S. 452, 41 Sup. Ct. 371 ( 1921). 
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· to such enhancement of price, if any, as is assignable to the 
Government's demands. We do not considei; whether the Com-
mission has power ta raise the price to the excepted class, 
because, even if it has, the plaintiffs have no right to 
require equality with the Government, and they have no other 
ground upon which to found their supposed right." 
The "excepted class" referred to consisted of certain oth~r takers 
not named who were charged stiU less than the government. 
(c) Regulation of Use of Highways. A state command to remove 
fifteen grade crossings by building one bridge for the highway and 
by constructing fourteen underpasses was sustained in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners36 over the dis-
sent of Chief Justice White and Justices Van Devanter and 
McReynolds. The chief complainant was an interstate railroad 
using the tracks under a perpetual lease which provided that if for 
any reason the lease should be terminated· the lessors should pay 
for all improvements. The company contended that the cost 
imposed on it would be over $2,000,000, that it had only $100,000 
available, and that the financial position of the lessor was so weak 
that it would never be able to reimburse the lessee for the improve· 
ments in case the lease ·were terminated. The latter objection was 
answered by saying that in that event the lessor would have the 
property and it would be subject to their obligation. On the gen-
eral question it was declared that "whatever the cost" the road may 
be required not to imperil the highway over which it does busi-
ness. On the question of the existing peril, the small number of 
accidents which had already .occurred was held not controlling, . 
since the situation was inherently dangerous, and the judgment of 
the state board and the state court was accepted. It was recognized 
that the state officials, in their anxiety for the well-being of the 
state, had hardly given due weight to the burden imposed on the 
company, but their action was held, nevertheless, within their con-
stitutional powers. Cases relied on by the roads were put to one 
side by saying that "the power of the state over grade crossings 
derives little light from cases on the power to regulate trains." To 
this Mr. Justice Holmes added : 
-:i6 254 U. S. 394, 4r Sup. Ct. 169 (1921). 
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"Grade crossings call for a necessary adjustment of two 
conflicting interests-that of the public using the streets and 
that of the railroad and the public using them. Generally 
the streets represent the more important interest of the two. 
There can be no doubt that they did when these railroads 
were laid out, or· that the advent of automobiles has given 
them an additional claim to consideration. They always are 
the necessity of the whole public, which the railroads, vital 
as they are, hardly can be called to the same extent. Being 
places to which the public is invited and that it necessarily 
frequents, the state, in the care of which this interest is and 
from which, ultimately, the railroads derive their right to 
occupy the land, has a constitl.!tional right to insist that they 
shall not be made dangerous t~ the public, whatever may be 
the cost to the parties introducing the danger. That is one 
of the most obvious cases of the police power, or, to put the 
same proposition in another form, the authority of the rail-
roads to project their moving masses across thoroughfares 
must be taken to be subject to the implied limitation that it 
may be cut down whenever and so far as the safety of the 
public requires. It was said that i,f the same requirement 
were made for the other grade crossings of the road it would 
soon be bankrupt. That the st_ates might be so foolish as to 
kill a goose that lays golden eggs for them, has no bearing 
on their constitutional rights. If it reasonably can be said 
that safety requires the change, it is for them to say whether 
they will insist upon it, and neither prospective bankruptcy 
nor engagement in interstate commerce can take away this 
fundamental right of the sovereign of the soil. * * * If the 
burdens imposed are so great· that the road cannot be run 
at a profit it can stop, whatever the misfortunes the stopping 
may produce. * * * Intelligent self-interest should lead to a 
careful consideration of what the road is able to do without 
ruin, but this is not a constitutional duty.'' 
Street railroads objected because compelled to pay ten per cent of 
the cost of removing the grade crossings over which they ran, and 
the steam railroad objected because the street railroads were not 
required to pay more. A water company resented being required 
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to pay for the cost of moving its pipes, and owners of private 
sidings disrelished the dislocation of their connections which the 
improvements would cause. These minor matters were held to be 
within the major power exerted. The fact that most of the high-
ways were laid out after the steam road had been built was not 
allowed to affect the exercise of the power.87 
The complaints unsuccessfully advanced in Detroit United Ry. 
v. Detroit38 were amorphous, hut amounted in substance to the 
insistence that an ordinance requiring a board to proceed to acquire, 
construct, and operate a municipal street railroad is an uncon-
stitutional attempt to compel the existing private company to sell 
its equipment at less than its fair value. The franchise of the 
complainant had expired and various ordinances permitting it to 
continue to operate were held not to give it anything more than a 
temporary and repealable license. It had already been held that 
the company could be required to remove its tracks, and Mr. Justice 
Day informed it that "if the city has the right to acquire the p_rop-
erty on the best terms it can make with the company in view of the 
expiration of its franchises, an attempt to carry out such purpose 
•by an offer to buy at much less than its value would not have the 
effect to deprive the company of property without due process of 
law." The court refused to consider complaints that the voters 
had been misled by the city officials, and it agreed with the court 
below that the submission of the question to the voters was in sub-
stantial compliance with the law. 
( d) Services and Facilities. Though a statute requiring the con-
struction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians 
on a railroad bridge was sustained in International Bridge Co. v. 
New Y ork39 as an exercise of the reserved power to amend the 
charter of the resisting corporation, it was declared also that the 
the legislation complained of did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The company had relied on the due-process as well as on 
s1 A· requirement to light the streets under a viaduct is treated in 5 
MINN. L. REv. 81; the compulsory elimination of grade crossings, in 69 U. 
PA. L. REv. 371. 
38 255 U. S. 171, 41 Sup. Ct. 285 ( 1921). 
an 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 56 (1920), 20 MICH. L. REv. 140-141. Chief 
Justice White and Justices McKenna and McReynolds dissented without 
telling us upon which one or ones of the several questions in the case. 
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the obligation-of-contracts clause. Since the court found that the 
company came under the duty to build these additional facilities 
by a statute consolidating two existing corporations and making 
the new creation subject to all the duties of each of the constituent 
members, the case cannot be said to declare that the later statute 
specifically requiring the roadway and pathway could stand alone. 
Nevertheless, the treatment of the issue in the opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes is not inconsistent with the theory that the statute was 
a proper exercise of the police power unless it interfered with 
existing contractual rights. Either deliberately or carelessly, Mr. 
Justice Holmes has succeeded in keeping us in doubt on the inter·· 
esting question whether the police power alone is capable of com-
pelling a bridge built for trains to add facilities for teams and 
pedestrians. 
( e) Privilege of Ceasing Business. In sustaining the require-
ment to remove grade crossings in Erie Railroad Co. v. Board of 
Public Utility Commissioners,40 Mr. Justice Holmes remarked that 
"if the burdens imposed are so great that the road cannot be run 
at a profit it can stop, whatever the misfortunes the stopping may 
produce." The same point was involved in a roundabout way in 
Bullock v. Florida.41 A foreclosure decree in a state court author-
ized a sale of an insolvent railroad with the privilege of dismantling 
it. The state commission secured from a higher state court a writ 
of prohibition against confirming so much of the sale as authorized 
the dismantling. "The ground of the decision was that in the 
absence of statute a railroad company has no right to divert its 
property to other uses without the consent of the state and that 
the lower court had no jurisdiction to make the prohibited portion 
of the decree in a proceeding in which the state was not a party 
until after the decree had been macle.'' This was held to raise a 
federal question, since the so-called jurisdiction of the court 
depended solely on the rights of the parties. As to this question, 
Mr. Justice Holmes declared : 
"Apart from statute or express contract, people who have 
put their money into a railroad are not bound to go on with 
40254 U.S. 394, 41 Sup. Ct. 169 (1921), note 36, supra. 
41 254 U. S. 513, 41 Sup. Ct. 193 (1921). 
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it at a loss if there is no reasonable prospect of profitable 
operation in the future. * * * No implied contract that they 
will do so can be elicited from the mere fact that they have 
accepted a charter from the state and have been allowed 
to exercise the power of eminent domain. * * * Without 
previous statute or contract, to compel the company to keep 
on at a loss would be an unconstitutional taking of its 
property." 
Nevertheless, the state court was allowed to issue its prohibition 
against expressly authorizing dismantling, because the purchaser 
would without such express permission have the same right as his 
vendor. This right, observed Mr. Justice Holmes, may be exer-
cised merely by stopping operations without prior consent of the 
state, if the facts justify it.42 
v. EMINENT DOMAIN 
Condemnation proceedings by the United States government 
brought four cases to the Supreme Court. United States v. Rogers43 
and United States v. Highsmith,44 in applying the established prin-
ciple that just compensation must be compensation as of the time 
when private owners are deprived of their property, allowed inter,. 
est from the time when lands were flooded by the works constructed 
by the government. The flooding involved in Bothwell v. United 
States45 caused the destruction of hay on the lands taken and the 
enforced sale of cattle at prices below their true value. No com-
pensation for these items was allowed in the condemnation pro-
ceedings. The owners, instead of appealing, brought an action 
against the government in the court of claims, which gave judgment 
for the value of the hay but not for the loss on the cattle. The 
government did not appeal, and so the Supreme Court refused to 
consider whether compensation for the hay was rightly given. As 
to the cattle, Mr. Justice McReynolds said~ 
42 In 9 CALIF. L. Rtv. 435 and 27 W. VA. L. Q. 95' are notes on Brooks-
Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183 (1920), 
19 MICH. L. REv. 137, which allowed a lumber company to abandon the 
operation of an unremunerative railroad. 
43 255 U. S. 163, 41 Sup. Ct. 281 ( 1921). 
44 255 U. S. I70, 4r Sup. Ct. 282 (1921). 
45 254 U. S. 231, 41 Sup. Ct. 74 (1920). 
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"Certainly appellants' position in respect of the items in 
question is no better than it would have been if no condem-
nation proceedings had been instituted. In the circumstances 
supposed, there might have been a recovery 'for what actually 
had been taken, upon the principle that the government by 
the very act of taking impliedly has promised to make com-
pensation because the dictates of justice and the terms of 
the Fifth Amendment so require.' * * * But nothing could 
have been recovered for the destruction of business or loss 
sustained through enforced sale of the cattle. There was no 
actual taking of these things by the United States, and conse-
quently no basis for an implied promise to make compensa-
tion. We need not consider the effect of the judgment in 
the condemnation proceedings." 
United States v. Coronado Beach Co.46 sustained an award of the 
value of an entire island taken by the government. The issue 
whether the company owned the tide lands in front of the upland 
of the island was decided in its favor, and a reservation in an old 
grant of power in the government" to take the land for arsenals, etc., 
was held not to impose a servitude which entitled the government 
to displace private owners without compensation.47 
Columbia University. THOMAS R.Eltn PowELL. 
(To be continued) 
46 255 U. S. 472, 4I Sup. Ct. 378 (I92I). 
47 For discussions of questions of eminent domain, see Minor Bronough, 
"lEsthetic or Sentimental Purpose as 'Public Use' within Meaning of Law 
of Eminent Domain," 24 LAW NO'l'i>s 89; and notes in IS Ir.r.. L. Rev. 278 
on finality of determination of necessity for taking by a railroad corporation, 
in I9 MICH. L. Riw. 448 on condemning land in another state under reciprocal 
state statutes, in 5 MINN. L. Rev. 394 on whether interurban service is an 
additional servitude, and in 7 VA. L. Rev. 656 on condemnation of property 
already devoted to a public use. 
